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FRINGE FIRMS AND INCENTIVES TO INNOVATE
JONATHAN B. BAKER*
In some industries, the most innovative firms are the industry leaders.
During the 1970s, for example, Kodak routinely introduced amateur
photography products a step ahead of its rivals.' In other industries,
the fringe producers are typically first to introduce new and improved
products or production processes. 2 "Royal Crown, not Coke or Pepsi,
produced the first diet cola, the first caffeine-free soft drinks, and the
first soft drinks in cans."3
Neither economic theory nor empirical economic studies offers a gen-
eral rule as to whether the leading firms or the fringe will be the main
source of innovation in most industries. Yet the stakes are high in under-
standing the connection between market structure and innovation. Two
decades of slow U.S. productivity growth have heightened interest in
public policies that promote innovation. Although the source of the
productivity problem is disputed-insufficient research and develop-
ment (R&D) may or may not be a leading cause'-innovation likely
occurs less frequently than would be socially optimal given the costs and
* Senior Economist, Council of Economic Advisers, and U.S. Department of Justice.
The views expressed are not necessarily those of the Council of Economic Advisers or the
Department of Justice. This article was developed in part as a comment on Richard J.
Gilbert & Steven Sunshine, Incorporating Dynamic Efficiency Concerns in Merger Analysis: The
Use of Innovation Markets, supra this issue, 63 ANTITRUST L.J. 569 (1995). The author is
indebted to Richard Gilbert, William Kovacic, David Levine, Mark Mazur, William McNa-
mara, David Pyke, Joseph Stiglitz, Eric Wolff, the Executive Editor, the O'Melveny & Myers
Centennial Grant Program, and the Tuck Associates.
Kodak's actions spawned a monopolization suit by a frustrated fringe rival. Berkey
Photo, Inc. v. Eastman Kodak, Co., 603 F.2d 263 (2d Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1093
(1980).
2 See F.M. SCHERER & DAVID Ross, INDUSTRIAL MARKET STRUCTURE AND ECONOMIC
PERFORMANCE 653 (3d ed. 1990) ("new entrants without a commitment to accepted technolo-
gies have been responsible for a substantial share of the really revolutionary new industrial
products and processes").
3 The Innovative Royal Crown, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 14, 1984, at 27.
For discussions of the productivity problem, its importance, and its sources, see MARTIN
N. BAILY & ALOK K. CHAKRABARTI, INNOVATION AND THE PRODUCTIVITY CRISIS (1988);
WILLIAM BAUMOL ET AL., PRODUCTIVITY AND AMERICAN LEADERSHIP: THE LONG VIEW
(1989); Zvi Griliches, Productivity Puzzles and R&D: Another Nonexplanation, 2J. ECON. PERSP.
9 (1988).
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opportunities of doing so.' In this environment, it is important that
antitrust analysis reflect an understanding of the way industry structure
may influence innovative effort.6
This article examines the circumstances under which fringe firms are
more likely than leading firms to innovate aggressively. This inquiry is
relevant to antitrust policy because many practices reviewed under the
antitrust laws-including horizontal joint ventures or mergers involving
large firms-can be understood in part as aiding the leading firms in
oligopolistic industries relative to their fringe rivals.7 While the classifica-
tion of the firms in a market as leading or fringe can be difficult, the
core concepts are clear.' Leading firms generally have larger market
shares than their fringe rivals (regardless of their absolute size or their
relative position in other markets). Leading firms will often recognize
that their output decisions will affect the price they receive; fringe firms
are more likely to act as price-takers. Fringe firms are likely to lack some
of the advantages that the leading firms possess, such as reputation
for quality, access to inexpensive or high quality inputs, or effective
distribution.
The significance of fringe innovation is highlighted in Part I by a case
study of the U.S. automobile market during the 1970s. During that
decade two Japanese automakers with little prior U.S. presence, Toyota
and Nissan, successfully penetrated the market by innovating more rap-
idly than the leading domestic automakers.9 Part II frames the question
of identifying when fringe firms can be expected to be the more innova-
' Studies of the return to investment in research and development invariably find that
the return to society is more than double the return to the firms making the investment,
suggesting that private markets provide less than the optimal incentive to innovate. E.g.,
Edwin Mansfield, Microeconomics of Technological Innovation, in TECHNOLOGY AND GLOBAL
INDUSTRY 31 l(Bruce R. Guile & Harvey Brooks eds., 1987); Jeffrey Bernstein & M. Ishaq
Nadiri, Interindustry R&D Spillovers, Rates of Return, and Production in High-Tech Industries,
78 AM. ECON. REV. 429 (1988).
6 Not every policy that encourages research and development is socially beneficial.
"Patent races," in which potential innovators in effect fish in a "common pool," can generate
overinvestment in R&D, wasteful duplication of R&D effort, or skew research effort away
from the most valuable opportunities by causing overinvestment in certain fields. Jennifer
Reinganum, The Timing of Innovation: Research, Development and Diffusion, in I HANDBOOK
OF INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION 861 (Richard Schmalensee & Robert D. Willig eds., 1989).
Antitrust rules that encourage R&D are unlikely to have such perverse effects, however.
' Many unilateral practices of dominant firms and many vertical agreements can also
be conceptualized in part as aiding leading firms relative to their fringe rivals.
" These concepts generalize the familiar economic models of a dominant firm with a
competitive fringe, and a Stackelberg leader with followers. E.g., SCHERER & Ross, supra
note 2, at 221-26.
9 To learn from Toyota's success, General Motors (GM) negotiated ajoint venture with
Toyota that was the subject of an intensive review by the Federal Trade Commission.
General Motors Corp., 103 F.T.C. 374 (1984).
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tive in terms of an entry-deterrence game between leading firms and
fringe firms. This perspective highlights several factors that encourage
leading firms to accommodate fringe innovation rather than deter it.
These factors likely led the fringe automakers to innovate more aggres-
sively than the Big Three during the 1970s. The final section identifies
one lesson for antitrust enforcers and courts: a case-by-case analysis
emphasizing the specific factors affecting firm R&D investments in indi-
vidual industries is important for understanding the influence of changes
in market structure on innovation.
I. JAPANESE AUTOMOBILES IN THE 1970S:
MARKET PENETRATION THROUGH RAPID INNOVATION' °
Which automobile producers benefited most from the demand shift
to small cars during the 1970s?" Not the Big Three-General Motors
(GM), Ford and Chrysler-despite their strong brand names, dealer
networks, and installed base.' 2 And not Volkswagen (VW), even though
the Beetle had previously dominated the subcompact niche with a supe-
rior product.1
3
The big winners in the United States were two fringe sellers: Nissan
(then called Datsun) and Toyota. As the decade began, they had tiny
market shares and sold low quality products. 4 But over the 1970s, these
firms innovated explosively. As a result, Japanese auto manufacturers
experienced productivity increases between 1970 and 1980 at more than
triple the rate of manufacturers in the United States, Canada, and Ger-
0 Unless otherwise noted, automobile industry statistics are taken from Ward's Automotive
Yearbook and automobile model quality information comes from Consumer Reports.
" The OPEC oil price shocks of 1974 and 1979 led to higher gasoline prices and
recessions. As a result, automobile demand shifted away from midsize and large cars,
toward more fuel-efficient compact and subcompact automobiles.
12 At the end of the 1960s, these three firms accounted for roughly 87% of new cars
sold in the United States.
13 At the end of the 1960s, Volkswagen was America's fourth major automobile company,
accounting for 6% of new car sales. Its sales were double those of American Motors, the
largest firm in the domestic fringe. Consumer Reports considered the 1969 VW Beetle the
"top choice for a second car" because it was "the most economical new car on the U.S.
market, considering purchase price, operating costs and resale value." Although this prod-
uct was strongly competitive, substantial room for improvement remained. The consumer
magazine complained about the Beetle's "mediocre ride, wind sensitivity, limited accommo-
dations, and poor heater design."
" At its U.S. debut in 1970, Consumer Reportsjudged the Toyota Corolla "Not Acceptable"
due to inadequate braking, and complained that the car rode and handled badly. As late
as April 1974, on the eve of the first OPEC oil shock, the four highest rated subcompact
models were European and American, not Japanese: the Fiat 128, AMC Gremlin, Opel
Manta, and Ford Mustang.
1995]
ANTITRUST LAW JOURNAL
many.'5 Year after year, Nissan and Toyota improved quality and low-
ered the price of their subcompact models.' 6 As the Japanese producers
found success in the market with high quality and low priced products, 7
consumers were also winners.
The Big Three and Volkswagen could not keep pace. The U.S. firms
contested the subcompact segment in the early and mid-1970s with mod-
els such as Ford's Maverick, Pinto, and Mustang, and Chevrolet's Vega
and Chevette. Initially, these models were comparable in price and qual-
ity to those from Nissan and Toyota. But by 1978, domestically produced
subcompacts were not close in quality to comparably priced imports such
as the Datsun B210 and Toyota Corolla.' 8 Volkswagen did not improve
the Beetle during the 1970s, and that model fell behind in relative qual-
ity.'" Volkswagen instead introduced a new model, the Rabbit, in 1975.
Yet while the Rabbit was an engineering marvel,20 it was no lower than
the middle of the pack in price.
The Japanese firms' success is commonly attributed to unique, distinc-
tively Japanese innovations in the production process. 2' Although there
15 MELVYN Fuss & LEONARD WAVERMAN, COSTS AND PRODUCTIVITY IN AUTOMOBILE PRO-
DUCTION: THE CHALLENGE OF JAPANESE EFFICIENCY 137 (1992). Most of the Japanese
productivity growth came from technical change rather than the exploitation of scale
economies. Id. In 1970, U.S. auto producers were 10% more efficient technically than
Japanese firms, but by 1975 the Japanese firms were 5% more efficient and by 1980
the Japanese advantage had increased to more than 20%. Id. at 218-22. The dramatic
productivity gains at Nissan and Toyota relative to their U.S. competitors are described
in MICHAEL A. CUSUMANO, THE JAPANESE AUTOMOBILE INDUSTRY 196-217 (1985).
"' The Toyota Corolla, deemed "Not Acceptable" by Consumer Reports in 1970, was
transformed in one year into a "handy car for around town." In 1971, the model ranked
in the middle of its class in quality. Three years later it was still average in quality, but it had
become the cheapest car in its class. The 1976 Corolla was among the highest subcompacts in
product quality and also among the lowest priced. Nissan also improved its models, though
not as dramatically.
17 Toyota's U.S. sales surpassed Volkswagen's for the first time in 1975, the very year
VW introduced a new subcompact model, the Rabbit. Nissan passed VW in 1976. By 1980,
Volkswagen's sales were half those of Nissan and Toyota, and Honda had become the
third highest selling subcompact brand.
"' The Big Three's captive imports, such as the Buick Opel, Dodge Colt, and Ford Fiesta,
kept better pace in quality than domestically-manufactured models.
19 By 1976, several rival subcompacts models, including the Toyota Corolla and Datsun
B210, underpriced the Beetle. At the same time, Consumer Reports complained that the
Beetle had been "left behind in automotive technology."
20 The 1976 Rabbit was ranked by Consumer Reports as the highest quality car in its class.
2' E.g., JAMES P. WOMACK ET AL., THE MACHINE THAT CHANGED THE WORLD 49, 79-82
(1990). This widely read study develops the notion of "lean production" (as distinguished
from "mass production") in part by contrasting the performance of Toyota with General
Motors. It does not observe, however, that Nissan's Japanese plants, which have been
nearly as productive as Toyota's, are based on an approach to the production process
more similar to that employed by GM.
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is some truth in this perspective-Toyota and Nissan indeed found ways
to improve quality and lower price more rapidly than their rivals, and
these improvements have spread to other firms, industries, and conti-
nents-this view is misleading because Toyota and Nissan did not inno-
vate in the same way.2 2 To be sure, Toyota developed and implemented
many of the innovations in the production process now considered dis-
tinctively Japanese, such as short production cycles, small production
lots, and the just-in-time inventory system. But Nissan improved quality
and lowered cost and price just as rapidly while organizing production
the way the Big Three did, with long production runs. Unlike the Big
Three during the 1970s, Nissan perfected the approach to production
employed by U.S. automakers by adopting well-known inventory and
quality control methods such as computerized scheduling and total qual-
ity control.23 As the remainder of this section will demonstrate in detail,
Nissan's and Toyota's success derived not from a common Japanese
innovation in the production process but rather because fringe producers
had a greater incentive to innovate than the leading firms in the U.S.
automobile oligopoly of the 1970s.
A. NISSAN AND THE "AMERICAN" PRODUCTION PROCESS
It is useful to begin by distinguishing between two different approaches
to the production process, which will be termed "American" and "Japa-
nese."24 The American approach is driven by the desire to achieve econo-
22 The description of Toyota's and Nissan's production processes during the 1970s relies
throughout on MICHAEL A. CUSUMANO, supra note 15. Cusumano highlights differences
in production strategy between the firms, and these differences suggest the distinction
between American and Japanese production processes made below.
Although the text emphasizes ways in which Nissan's approach to production was more
similar to that of the Big Three than to Toyota, on some dimensions the two Japanese
firms were more similar to each other than to their U.S. rivals. The greatest similarity may
have involved labor relations in the workplace. See DAVID 1. LEVINE, REINVENTING THE
WORKPLACE: How BUSINESS AND EMPLOYEES CAN BOTH WIN (forthcoming 1995); Cusu-
MANO, supra note 15, at 137. Both Japanese firms also adopted modern quality control
strategies in advance of their U.S. rivals.
23 In the past decade, however, the Big Three have improved their production processes
in ways similar to those adopted by their Japanese rivals.
24 This distinction is made for analytic clarity. Any actual production system, including
those of Nissan and Toyota, combines elements of both models. Differences in inventory
management between U.S. and Japanese firms are clarified in David F. Pyke & Morris A.
Cohen, Push and Pull in Manufacturing and Distribution Systems, 9 J. OPERATIONS MGMT, 24
(1990). For discussions of other differences between American and Japanese firms, see
Masahiko Aoki, Toward an Economic Model of the Japanese Firm, 28 J. ECON. L. 1 (1990);
Debra J. Aron & Pau Olivella, Bonuses and Penalty Schemes as Equilibrium Incentive Devices,
with Application to Manufacturing Systems, 10 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 1, 18-21 (1994); LEVINE,
supra note 22.
1995]
ANTITRUST LAW JOURNAL
mies of scale.2 5 By achieving long runs of machine tools and other pro-
duction equipment, the firm can minimize changeover costs (setup costs
and the costs of retraining workers for new jobs), and so lower its average
production costs.
To optimize the American production process, a firm must work to
increase production speed. The faster that production takes place, the
lower the labor and materials holding costs required to make a given
level of output, so the lower the average production cost to the firm.
Anything that interrupts planned production runs destroys the source
of the anticipated economies. Accordingly, a firm with an American
production process must ensure that production operations involving
long runs are never short of material to work on. To optimize the Ameri-
can system, a firm must in consequence work to improve three aspects
of its manufacturing operation.
First, the firm must build an inventory of raw materials and work in
process, and "push" completed work on to the next work station rather
than stop a production run if completed work builds up. Yet holding
inventory is costly, as it ties up working capital. Hence, the firm must plan
its operations to manage inventory and work in process levels carefully.
Second, a firm with an American production process must hold excess
production capacity upstream to minimize the danger that machine
downtime for feed operations will interrupt the flow of work in process
to later operations involving long production runs. Because holding
redundant, idle capacity is costly, the firm must assess the risk of equip-
ment malfunction when it invests in machinery and plans the arrange-
ment of work in the production process.
Finally, quality problems in the broadest sense-design errors, produc-
tion mistakes, defective components, and poor raw materials-are expen-
sive for any firm. But they are particularly costly for a firm geared to
achieve scale economies because they create a significant risk of ruining
a large amount of output before detection.26 If the output of a long
production run must be scrapped, the anticipated scale economies disap-
25 See Armen Alchian, Costs and Outputs, in THE ALLOCATION OF ECONOMIC RESOURCES
23-40 (Moses Abramovitz et al. eds., 1959). For a description of an American production
process in automobiles that argues that scale economies were far from exhausted in stamp-
ing operations for auto body manufacturing in the early 1970s, see John McGee, Economies
of Size in Auto Body Manufacture, 17 J.L. & ECON. 239 (1974).
26 Defects that arrive randomly by the production "batch" are more costly for a firm
employing large batches in production than for a firm employing small batches.
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pear. In consequence, a firm seeking to optimize the American produc-
tion process must work to improve its quality control.27
Nissan organized its production operations mainly as an American
process.2' The central difference between its production strategy and
that of the Big Three domestic U.S. producers during the 1970s was
not in the approach to production. Rather, the difference was in Nissan's
greater willingness to adopt improvements to the American process that
speeded production and addressed the key problems of inventory man-
agement, production scheduling, and quality control. In optimizing the
American production process, Nissan adopted production innovations
known to the Big Three but not accepted as quickly or enthusiastically
by the U.S. firms.
To speed production, Nissan became a leader in automation. It
adopted automated production and conveyance equipment on assembly
lines in the 1950s and early 1960s and automated welding machinery
(robotics) in the mid-1960s. 29 To lower inventories, Nissan became a
leader in the use of computerized scheduling.3" By the end of the 1960s,
it had computerized all phases of production control.31 In 1971 the
firm extended computerized scheduling upstream to the procurement
of materials and components and downstream to the ordering of final
products by dealers and the delivery of finished products to them.32 The
resulting improvements in production coordination more than halved
Nissan's average lead time to produce an automobile. 3
To control quality, Nissan embraced the statistical methods popular-
ized by W. Edwards*Deming andJosephJuran.34 These methods involved
27 Cf. R.U. Ayres, CIM: A Challenge to Technology Management, 7 INT'LJ. TECH. MGMT. 17,
18-19 (Special Issue on Strengthening Corporate and National Competitiveness Through
Technology 1992) (a firm with an American production process may be able to improve
quality at less expense than a firm with a Japanese process because the latter approach
adds complexity).
2s Nissan learned modern manufacturing by licensing, in 1952, the rights to assemble
from knock-down sets a British automobile designed by Austin. Although it weaned itself
off Austin's support in less than a decade, by modifying the Austin design and production
process and substituting Japanese parts and machine tools for imported components,
Nissan preserved an American production process based on the achievement of scale
economies. See CUSUMANO, supra note 15, at 8-11, 97-108; cf. Jerome B. Cohen, Private
Point Four in Japan, FORTUNE, April 1953, at 148 (Japanese firms systematically employed
joint ventures with U.S. firms to acquire modern know-how).
29 CUSUMANO, supra note 15, at 227-30, 307-12.
3 01d. at 296, 316.
"' Id. at 227.
32 Id. at 308, 317.
3
1 Id. at 317.
34 Id. at 320-24.
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more than the use of statistical sampling and inspection to identify quality
problems: they encouraged firms to modify production equipment and
the manufacturing process in order to reduce defect levels by increasing
product uniformity.3 5 Around 1960, quality control engineers took this
idea one step further: they came to see their primary task as preventing
quality problems rather than screening out defective products, and so
developed the concept of "total quality control., 36 Firms such as Nissan
learned to work with their customers to modify products to solve prob-
lems or improve product design. 37 They learned to insist on defect-free
materials and components and to encourage their suppliers to institute
their own quality control programs.3 ' Firms came to rely upon shop
floor workers to help identify opportunities for product and process
improvements, 3 9 rather than merely delegating quality control to a sepa-
rate engineering staff.40
B. TOYOTA AND THE "JAPANESE" PRODUCTION PROCESS4
If the American production process centers around the achievement
of economies of scale, the Japanese process is organized around the
achievement of production flexibility. With flexibility, firms can quickly
and cheaply alter existing products and the production process, add new
3
"Japanese firms adopting Deming's ideas in the mid-1950s reported large, rapid in-
creases in productivity. DAVID HALBERSTAM, THE RECKONING 316 (1986). Nissan's adoption
of automated production machinery and customized machine tools may have facilitated
the company's use of these techniques.
36 CUSUMANO, supra note 15, at 324-42. These ideas were developed mainly by Americans,
especially Armand V. Feigenbaum of General Electric, along with Deming and Juran. But
these ideas were largely ignored in the U.S. while studied carefully in Japan. For ajournalis-
tic treatment highlighting Deming's contribution, see ANDREA GABOR, THE MAN WHO
DISCOVERED QUALITY (1990). For a description of total quality management that emphasizes
employer involvement, see LEVINE, supra note 22, at ch. l.A.
7 CUSUMANO, supra note 15, at 330-3 1.
36 Id. at 245, 258, 377.
3 As early as the mid-1950s, Japanese automakers gave their employees the authority
to stop assembly lines when they noticed defects or errors. Id. at 328.
40 In 1960, as a result of its efforts to improve quality in the years before it successfully
penetrated the U.S. small car market, Nissan won the Deming prize, awarded annually
by the Japanese Union of Scientists and Engineers to a firm that developed an institutional
commitment to quality control. Id. at 350. Toyota won the Deming prize five years later,
consistent with the view that improved quality control may be more critical for a firm that
relies on an American production process than for one that relies on ajapanese production
process.
" See generally JAPAN MANAGEMENT ASS'N, KANBAN: JUST-IN-TIME AT TOYOTA (1989). For
another example of a Japanese production process, in camera and copier manufacturing,
see JAPAN MANAGEMENT ASS'N, CANON PRODUCTION SYSTEM (1987). Complementarities
among the many aspects of the Japanese process are emphasized by Paul Milgrom & John
Roberts, The Economics of Modern Manufacturing: Technology, Strategy, and Organization, 80
AM. ECON. REV. 511 (1990).
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products, customize their products, or vary the output mix of existing
products. These options facilitate firm efforts to meet changing buyer
tastes and take advantage of opportunities to improve quality and lower
cost. They also help multiproduct firms transfer their expertise in the
process for producing one good to the manufacture of other products.4 2
To achieve production flexibility, Toyota modified its production pro-
cess in ways antithetical to the American system. It employed short pro-
duction cycles and small production lots. 43 It also designed a more flexible
production process, as by making greater use of universal (rather than
customized) machine tools.
4
"
The Japanese production process gives up the ability to plan for long
production runs in exchange for ease in instituting product and process
modifications and the ability to achieve product variety inexpensively.
45
To optimize this production system, firms must work to minimize three
potential problems. First, they must keep production setup times short;
otherwise, costs can become astronomical. Accordingly, Toyota designed
its production process for rapid setup modification. It developed ways
of reducing machinery setup times, including completing preparations
before the machines stopped, employing standardized parts across multi-
ple setups, redesigning fasteners, training workers in setup modification,
and redesigning stamping equipment to accept new dies in the right place
without need for adjustment. Through such methods, Toyota shrank the
time needed to change stamping dies from two or three hours before
1955 to fifteen minutes by 1962 and three minutes by 1971.46
12 Thus, production flexibility permits manufacturers to achieve scope economies in
producing multiple products that can compensate in part for any loss of scale economies
in producing individual products. Ayres, supra note 27, at 17, 20-21; cf. ALFRED D. CHAN-
DLER,JR., SCALE AND SCOPE (1990) (stressing the importance of scope economies in modern
manufacturing).
13 In 1977, for example, Toyota produced most components made in stamping plants
in lots equal to one day's supply, and changed dies three times per day. In contrast, U.S.
and European manufacturers employing American production processes manufactured
in lots equivalent to 10 or 30 days' supply and reset equipment every day or two. CUSUMANO,
supra note 15, at 285.
44 Id. at 66, 249.
4 5 JAMES C. ABEGGLEN & GEORGE STALK, JR., KAISHA, THE JAPANESE CORPORATION 94
(Toyota goal of increasing product variety), I1l (increased ability to respond to changes
in demand), 118 (strategic value of product line expansion) (1985); see WOMACK ET AL.,
supra note 21 at 64-65 (product variety at Toyota).
46 CUSUMANO, supra note 15, at 284-87; see Toyota-ism Means War on Waste, ECONOMIST,
May 30, 1987, Factory of the Future Survey, at 12-13 (methods of reducing setup times);
cf. ABEGGLEN & STALK, supra note 45, at 96-97 (companies following Toyota's example
have also concentrated on reducing setup times). Short setups also lower costs for a firm
with an American production process, but the resulting cost reductions are less significant
determinants of average costs than for a firm with a Japanese process. While Nissan also
cut setup times dramatically, its times were consistently triple those of Toyota. CUSUMANO,
1995]
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Second, a firm with a Japanese production process must avoid creating
work in process unless it is confident that the production process will
carry through to a finished good. Otherwise, product or process alter-
ations made possible by production flexibility could lead to costly liquida-
tions of inventories of partially completed work. To avoid this problem
with production flexibility and keep inventory holding costs low, Toyota
invented a "pull" inventory system-the "kanban" or "just-in-time" sys-
tem-to replace the push system employed by firms using an American
production process.47 Under this system, earlier work is not authorized
until it is demanded by a later production step, work in process is not
created or improved without a guarantee that it is needed, and compo-
nents from suppliers are delivered just before they are needed.48 The
just-in-time system operates with simple, decentralized coordination: a
downstream process requiring more inputs merely orders more from
the preceding production step, and these orders are quickly transmitted
backwards when the earlier processes order inputs of their own. 49
Third, to optimize the Japanese production process, a firm must work
to identify product and process improvements frequently and implement
them rapidly.50 Only then will it obtain the benefits from production
flexibility that compensate for the loss of scale economies. In part, this
occurs automatically as a byproduct of the just-in-time inventory system.
Just-in-time automatically helps the firm identify process improvements
by directing attention to production bottlenecks. 1 If one production
supra note 15, at 284-87. As late as the early 1980s, by contrast, many U.S. and European
manufacturers took hours to change dies. Id. Japanese manufacturers have also reduced
the time required to retool entire factories for new models. While their U.S. rivals take
months, they retool in days. Motown's Struggle to Shift on the Fly, Bus. WK., July 11, 1994,
at 111-12.
" Toyota engineer Taiichi Ohno worked out the kanban approach to inventory manage-
ment in the 1950s and 1960s. ABEGGLEN & STALK, supra note 45, at 93. Toyota insisted
that its suppliers adopt it as well. CUSUMANO, supra note 15, at 298-99.
"' ABEGGLEN & STALK, supra note 45, at 102-03. The just-in-time inventory system has
difficulty accommodating unexpected variation in demand, especially when a large number
of production steps occur in sequence. CUSUMANO, supra note 15, at 292; cf. ABEGGLEN &
STALK, supra note 45, at 103-04, 110-11 (Toyota freezes production schedules for a week
or month to ensure level production rates); but cf. id. at 111 (flexibility makes a Japanese
production process more suitable to an environment with uncertain demand). Because
Toyota was generally operating at full production capacity during the 1960s and 1970s,
id. at 237, this problem was not serious.
49 In contrast, complex and centralized coordination is required to minimize inventories
while maximizing production runs in the American production process. Accordingly,
Nissan embraced computerization in the 1960s and 1970s, while Toyota resisted it. Id. at
296-98.
50 For this reason, the Japanese production process is not just an innovation in the
process of manufacturing; it also represents an innovation in the process of innovation.
5' RICHARD J. SCHONBERGER, JAPANESE MANUFACTURING TECHNIQUES 15 (1982).
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step has trouble producing what is demanded of it in time, in sufficient
quantities, or free of defects, that fact is quickly highlighted under just-
in-time because the firm lacks a buffer stock of earlier production to
draw down. Workers, engineers, and managers are thus led to consider
changes in the production process or product design to address the
bottleneck-improvements likely to have a high payoff in cost reduc-
tion-and those changes can readily be implemented within the system
of flexible production.52 Then attention will turn to the next bottleneck,
and so a process of incremental cost reduction-a process of organiza-
tional learning termed "kaizen" (continuous improvement) in Japan-is
institutionalized.S
Firms seeking to optimize the Japanese production system by taking
advantage of the benefits of production flexibility also work to identify
more product and production process innovations by investing in infor-
mation.54 Through market research and customer relations, they seek
to identify desirable product modifications frequently. 55 They keep
abreast of innovations adopted by their rivals, and work quickly to dupli-
cate them. They work with suppliers to harmonize operations and iden-
tify process improvements that lower joint costs. They benchmark their
production process against that of unrelated firms. While firms em-
ploying an American production system can also benefit from identifying
valuable innovations, such information may often be used more effi-
ciently by a firm with a Japanese production process.
" For example, factories may alter shop floor layout to reduce materials handling.
ABEGGLEN & STALK, supra note 45, at 98. Other examples are described in LEVINE, supra
note 22, ch. II.A.
Changes to the production process that take the form of production line speedup rather
than modifications in product design or production machinery run the risk of generating
worker hostility, however. This has been the complaint of some U.S. unions aboutJapanese-
run plants. MIKE PARKER & JANE SLAUGHTER, CHOOSING SIDES: UNIONS AND THE TEAM
CONCEPT (1988).
's Although firms employing an American production process also obtain cost reductions
from learning-by-doing, the rate of learning is likely accelerated in the Japanese production
system because of this feature.
5' See What Makes Yoshio Invent, EcONOMIST,Jan. 12, 1991, at 61 (free flow of information
is critical to rapid new product development). To process this information, firms develop
new organizational forms. See Er. . ., ECONOMIST, Sept. 8, 1990, at 76. To make use of this
information, they develop ways of relating it to the firm's core competencies. See Competing
with Tomorrow, ECONOMIST, May 12, 1990, at 65-66. For this reason, successful innovations
tend to be closely related to firms' existing technological and marketing skills, and occur
in product fields close to existing products. Giovanni Dosi, Sources, Procedures, and Microeco-
nomic Effects of Innovation, 26 J. ECON. LIT. 1120, 1131 (1988).
5 See King Customer, Bus. WK., Mar. 12, 1990, at 88, 89-90 (Japanese firms succeeded
relative to U.S. firms through "assiduously uncovering and accommodating customer
needs"). During the 1960s, Toyota was more aggressive than Nissan in modifying its
product in order to please U.S. consumers. Cf. HALBERSTAM, supra note 35, at 428, 436-
42 (Nissan's experience).
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These information and innovation demands appear to encourage in-
terfirm collaboration.56 This trend is apparent in the automotive industry,
where joint ventures have become commonplace-even spreading to
firms with American production processes. 7 The highest profile ventures
connect competitors in production or marketing, but other ventures
among competitors involve R&D or the production of components.5
Once firms adopting a Japanese process identify desirable product
and process modifications, they work to implement these improvements
rapidly. 59 They seek to engineer products quickly and move new innova-
tions rapidly from the drawing board to the production line.60 These
firms try to design products and the production process in ways that
make it easy to accept improvements-such as modular product design
and adaptable shop floor organization. 6'
C. THE AGILE MANUFACTURING SYNTHESIS
The Japanese production process did not fully displace the American
production process in the automobile industry of the 1970s because, as
Nissan's success demonstrates, improvements to the American produc-
56 Much of this collaboration involves vertically-related firms, connecting firms with their
suppliers or dealers. Joint ventures among competitors-which have historically generated
the closest antitrust scrutiny-are also encouraged. Alliances among rivals, once rare, now
seem common. Holding Hands, ECONOMIST, Mar. 27, 1993, Multinationals Survey, at 14.
Firms making these alliances frequently report that they do so to speed the rate of innova-
tion. Id. As new information and telecommunications networks are developed, those innova-
tions will likely facilitate even wider and more frequent interfirm collaboration than now
occurs. Cf. COUNCIL OF ECONOMIC ADVISERS, ECONOMIC BENEFITS OF THE ADMINISTRATION'S
LEGISLATIVE PROPOSALS, June 14, 1994 (forecasting developments in telecommunications).
57 Spot the Difference, ECONOMIST, Feb. 24, 1990, at 74.
51 PETER F. COWLEY & JONATHAN D. IRONSTONE, MANAGING THE WORLD ECONOMY: THE
CONSEQUENCES OF CORPORATE ALLIANCES 104-20 (1993). General Motors builds the Geo
Prizm in a joint venture with Toyota and the Geo Metro in a joint venture with Suzuki.
It also purchases the Geo Storm from Isuzu and the Geo Tracer from Suzuki. Ford owns
a stake in Mazda, and Chrysler has been allied with Matsushita and Hyundai.
5' The expansion of production processes based on flexibility may also lead to greater
product variety-if innovative effort focuses on adding more products to serve narrow
niches as well as improving existing products and processes.
60 See Kim R. Clark et al., Product Development in the World Auto Industry, 1987 BROOKINGS
PAPERS ON ECON. ACTIVITY 729, 743-49 (Japanese firms exhibit short lead times in product
development). Concurrent engineering, a contemporary approach to rapid product devel-
opment, was invented in Japan. A Smarter Way to Manufacture, Bus. WK., Apr. 30, 1990,
at 110-17.
61 At the Unstrain'd Mercy of Quality, ECONOMIST, Apr. 21, 1990, at 82; THOMAS E. VOLLMAN
ET AL., MANUFACTURING PLANNING AND CONTROL SYSTEMS 259-61 (2d ed. 1988). To accom-
modate such changes, these firms frequently cross-train workers. Id. at 243-45; ABEGGLEN
& STALK, supra note 45, at 99; cf. The Car Makers'Recovery Stakes, ECONOMIST, Oct. 29, 1994,
at 73 ("what now determines competitive advantage is the ability to design cars that are
cheaper to build than those of competitors").
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tion process conferred productivity advantages comparable to those ob-
tained from a Japanese process. The "winning" production system may
never be determined, moreover, because the two approaches to produc-
tion are increasingly blurred with the development of a hybrid pro-
duction system sometimes termed "agile manufacturing." Agile manu-
facturing is based upon flexible robots and computer-integrated
manufacturing.6"
Agile manufacturing promises to combine the best features of the
American and Japanese systems.6" When computer controlled machine
tools and robots can quickly shift tasks without compromising speed,
accuracy, and reliability, it may become possible to achieve the advantages
of both long production runs and flexibility.64 Plants will be able to
assemble more than one product on the same production line simultane-
ously,65 for example, and modify processes and products rapidly.66
In the automobile industry of the 1970s, the Japanese and the Ameri-
can production systems were more distinct than they appear today. Nis-
san and Toyota were both extremely innovative, especially in improving
the production process. Because they improved fundamentally different
production processes, their success cannot be attributed to a common
set of innovations. Rather, as will be demonstrated in the next section,
the two Japanese firms succeeded because U.S. market conditions gave
these fringe producers stronger incentives to innovate than it gave the
62 R.U. Ayres, supra note 27, at 17, 22-23 (computer-integrated manufacturing is the
next stage in industrial evolution). The Challenge, ECONOMIST, May 30, 1987, Factory of
the Future Survey, at 1; F. Hiatt, Japan Creating Mass-Produced Customization, WASH. POST,
Mar. 25, 1990, at A29; Bodybuilding Without Tears, ECONOMIST, Apr. 21, 1990, at 95-96;
cf. John Holusha, Industry Is Learning to Love Agility, N.Y. TIMES, May 25, 1994, at DI
(highlighting organizational innovations that facilitate agile manufacturing).
63 Automation does not automatically confer these advantages. A firm that automates
an inefficient production process will not be as successful as one that automates an efficient
process. Accordingly, firms seeking to adopt or modify an agile manufacturing system
must first optimize their American or Japanese production process, then automate it. In
consequence, pilot production runs using an American or Japanese process, during which
process optimization can occur, will likely remain an essential adjunct to agile manufactur-
ing. Cf. LEVINE, supra note 22, ch. II.A (describing a pilot team at Toyota).
6' What Would Henry Think? ECONOMIST, May 30, 1987, Factory of the Future Survey,
at 4; Manufacturing d la Carte: Agile Assembly Lines, Faster Development Cycles, IEEE SPECTRUM,
Sept. 1993, at 24; see A.C. Boynton et al., New Competitive Strategies: Challenges to Organizations
and Information Technology, 32 IBM Svs. J. 40 (1993); cf. Putting It All Together, ECONOMIST,
Mar. 5, 1994, at 13-15 (describing ways of arranging a manufacturing facility employing
robots to achieve flexibility and efficiency).
65 Although Toyota experimented with mixed assembly in the 1950s, CUSUMANO, supra
note 15, at 281-84, robotics makes this approach more attractive and more common today.
Retooling with Software, AUTOMOTIVE ENG'G, July 1991, at 78 (describing Nissan's "In-
telligent Body Assembly System").
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leading firms: General Motors, Ford, Chrysler, and the leading subcom-
pact producer, Volkswagen.
II. FRINGE INCENTIVES TO INNOVATE
Leading firms can often make R&D investments to deter fringe firms
from undertaking aggressive innovation efforts.67 This makes the distinc-
tion between leading and fringe firms important to understanding incen-
tives to innovate.
Leading firms in industries in which innovation is important are con-
fronted with a strategic choice between deterrence and accommodation.
If the leading firms choose deterrence, they will likely become the pri-
mary sources of industry innovation; the fringe firms will generally do
no more than imitate successful new products or processes of the leading
firms. If the leading firms instead choose accommodation, the fringe
will likely become the primary source of industry innovation.6 8 Nissan
and Toyota were encouraged to innovate during the 197 0s because the
Big Three automakers likely found it more profitable to adopt an accom-
modation strategy in the market for small cars than a deterrence
strategy.6 9
67 The discussion in the text emphasizes the incentives to innovate arising out of the
way R&D investments affect the rivalry between leading firms and fringe firms. See Michael
Katz & Carl Shapiro, R&D Rivalry with Licensing or Imitation, 77 AM. ECON. REV. 402 (1987)
(describing potential preemptive effect of innovation); Richard Gilbert, Mobility Barriers,
in I HANDBOOK OF INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION 475 (Richard Schmalensee & Robert D.
Willig eds., 1989) (describing strategic entry deterrence generally). A host of non-strategic
factors not highlighted in the text, including the direct effect of cost reductions or new
products on profits, the appropriability of new ideas by their innovators, and the nature
of buyer demand, as well as differences among leading and fringe firms, are also important
in explaining firm incentives to innovate. See generally Jennifer Reinganum, supra note 6
(survey of economic literature on innovation incentives); JEAN TIROLE, THE THEORY OF
INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION 387 (1988) (same); Wesley M. Cohen & Richard C. Levin,
Empirical Studies of Innovation and Market Structure, in 2 HANDBOOK OF INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZA-
TION 1059 (Richard Schmalensee & Robert D. Willig eds., 1989) (empirical evidence sur-
veyed). This article does not address the effects on aggregate welfare of government
policies that might change the relative incentives of fringe and leading firms to innovate.
68 Here the fringe firms can be thought of as "mavericks" that innovate aggressively
when the leading firms do not. On the role of mavericks in constraining coordinated
oligopoly pricing in product markets, see Jonathan B. Baker, Two Sherman Act Section 1
Dilemmas: Parallel Pricing, the Oligopoly Problem, and Contemporary Economic Theory, 38 ANTI-
TRUST BULL. 143, 199-207 (1993).
69 It is unconvincing to attribute the rapid productivity growth of Japanese automakers
in the 1970s instead to the relatively higher cash flow of Japanese automobile manufacturers
compared with U.S. automakers during the oil shock decade; but cf. Bruce Greenwald et
al., Imperfect Capital Markets and Productivity Growth (unpublished manuscript, April
14, 1992) (financial constraints led U.S. automakers to reduce R&D expenditures during
the 1970s, despite the incentive to increase R&D arguably created by the oil shocks).
Assuming, in sympathy with this theory, that internal finance was a lower cost method of
funding R&D for U.S. firms than borrowing in the capital markets, the theory nevertheless
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The leading firms may seek to deter fringe innovation by investing
heavily in R&D. With an active research capability, the leading firms can
expect to imitate fringe innovations rapidly, and so make it unlikely that
a fringe producer will be able to benefit greatly from introducing new
products or processes.70 Recognizing this, the fringe will find aggressive
efforts to pursue new ideas an unattractive strategy.
An active leading firm R&D effort does more than deter the fringe:
with this strategy, the leading firms are likely to bring new ideas rapidly
to market themselves, before fringe firms can do so. The leading firms
will become the primary source of new products, and the fringe will find
it more profitable to imitate proven leading firm innovations than to
seek to innovate first.7'
Yet a leading firm deterrence strategy is costly; it can involve substantial
investments in R&D and it runs the risk of wasting those expenditures
if efforts to innovate do not pan out. To avoid these costs, the leading
firms may instead choose to accommodate fringe entry, rather than
seeking to deter it. Then the fringe is likely to innovate first and over
time grow in significance. In contrast with the consequences of leading
firm deterrence, here the leading firms will allow their market dominance
to erode. But by avoiding the costs of deterrence, they will earn greater
profits in the short term that may more than make up for reduced long-
term profits.72
has difficulty explaining why Japanese automakers also increased productivity more rapidly
than the Big Three before the oil shocks created the alleged cash flow constraints. See
CUSUMANO, supra note 15, at 199.
70 R&D investments are typically sunk expenditures, making strategic commitments such
as this possible. The discussion in the text assumes that additional R&D investments make
the leading firms "tougher" (more likely to match fringe innovation quickly). In the "animal"
language proposed by Fudenberg and Tirole to describe business strategies, the leading
firms will in consequence adopt either a "top dog" strategy to deter the fringe by appearing
aggressive, or a "puppy dog" strategy that accommodates the fringe while appearing
inoffensive. See Gilbert, supra note 67, at 509-10; cf. SCHERER & Ross, supra note 2, at 635
(describing the "frequently observed tendency for market dominating firms to be slow in
developing important new products, but to roar back like tigers when smaller rivals-
often new entrants with no historical market share at all-challenge their dominance").
71 See Gilbert, supra note 67, at 510 (circumstances under which an incumbent overinvests
to deter entry); Richard Gilbert & David Newbery, Preemptive Patenting and the Persistence
of Monopoly, 72 AM. ECON. REv. 514 (1982) (a firm with monopoly power has an incentive
to maintain that power by developing new technologies before potential competitors); cf.
SCHERER & Ross, supra note 2, at 654 (describing cases in which "the threat of entry
through innovation by a newcomer stimulated existing members to pursue well-known
technical possibilities more aggressively.")
12 See Jennifer Reinganum, Uncertain Innovation and the Persistence of Monopoly, 73 AM.
ECON. REV. 741 (1983); Gilbert, supra note 67, at 510 (conditions under which an incumbent
accommodates entry); Jennifer Reinganum, Innovation and Industry Evolution, 100 Q.J.
EcON. 81 (1985).
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A number of factors are likely to encourage leading firm accommoda-
tion of aggressive fringe research and development, and thus lead to a
market in which fringe firms are the more innovative.73 First, if leading
firm innovation imposes costs beyond the direct expenditures on R&D
that fringe innovation does not impose, so that deterrence is more expen-
sive than accommodation, the leading firms are more likely to prefer
accommodation."4 The most notable indirect costs of developing new
products or processes involve a reduction in the value of firm capital
devoted to old products or processes-a cost often termed "cannibaliza-
tion." For this factor to favor leading firm accommodation, leading firm
innovation must impose greater indirect costs on the leading firms than
would innovation by the fringe.
This observation was likely important in explaining the accommoda-
tion strategy of the Big Three automakers in the U.S. automobile market
during the 1970s. The Big Three producers recognized that if they
introduced an attractive subcompact model, many customers would
switch away from their more profitable larger car models. The value
of Big Three capital devoted to midsize cars would fall. But if a new
subcompact were instead introduced by Japanese automakers, the substi-
tution away from the Big Three's larger models and thus the indirect
loss to the Big Three would be less because of product differentiation.
A Big Three subcompact would be perceived as a closer substitute than
a Japanese subcompact for a Big Three midsize car because the two Big
Three models would share in brand reputation and dealer network.7 5
7' These are not the only relevant factors, but they are probably the most important in
explaining the Big Three's decision to accommodate fringe innovation during the 1970s.
Cf. SCHERER & Ross, supra note 2, at 636, 637 n.63 (a dominant firm will be "more inclined
to preempt than lag" if a laggard can lower costs by observing and avoiding first movers'
false technical starts, if small interlopers initially penetrate the market only slowly, the
more perfect patent protection is, the more the innovation threatens the dominant firm's
rents in existing markets, the less uncertain R&D completion time is, the less likely licensing
of the challenger's technology is, and the less likely multiple challenges are); WILLIAM
BAUMOL, ENTREPRENEURSHIP, MANAGEMENT, AND THE STRUCTURE OF PAYOFFS 151-52(1993)
(factors encouraging a firm to become an "original innovator" rather than an imitator
include a proliferation of prospective innovators, high costs of imitation imposed by innova-
tor patents, long lifetime of innovator's product, low risk undertaken by innovator, and
low spillovers of new ideas from innovator to imitators).
" See Reinganum, Uncertain Innovation, supra note 72; cf. Katz & Shapiro, supra note 67
(significance of "stand alone" innovation incentives).
7- Nor would the Japanese automakers likely increase the scale or scope of their entry
to the point where the indirect cost to the Big Three is the same as would be generated
were the Big Three to introduce subcompact models. The Big Three's advantages in
brand reputation and distribution, perhaps combined with decreasing returns to scale in
production and distribution, effectively confronted the Japanese firms with a rising mar-
ginal cost of sales expansion, limiting for a time the practical extent of their diversion of
Big Three sales. Cf. Judith Gelman & Steven Salop, Judo Economics: Capacity Limitation and
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Thus, the prospect of a greater capital loss from Big Three entry than
from fringe entry likely discouraged aggressive Big Three pursuit of
the subcompact segment.
Second, leading firms will tend to prefer accommodation to deterrence
when the ability of the fringe to expand, even with an attractive innova-
tion, is limited.76 In this case, the benefits of the deterrence strategy may
be low relative to the costs. The leading firms may reasonably believe
this when disadvantages like inferior distribution or low reputation for
quality are likely to limit the rate of sales growth of an entrant, even if
the entrant employs a lower cost process or sells an improved product.
The leading firms may also expect that the fringe's ability to profit from
an innovation will be limited when likely innovations are minor rather
than drastic (not essential to survival in the industry), or when the leading
firms would reasonably expect to imitate fringe innovations within a
reasonable time even absent R&D expenditures on deterrence.77
This factor is also likely important in explaining the accommodation
behavior of the Big Three automakers during the 1970s. The Big Three's
strong dealer networks and brand reputations then conferred a substan-
tial advantage relative to Volkswagen, and there was no reason to think
that Japanese entrants would have greater market success than VW. And
if fringe producers came up with product or process improvements,
the Big Three, with all these advantages, would reasonably expect to
recapture the market through imitation.78 Even in retrospect, this recon-
structed calculation does not appear entirely off the mark: despite the
surprising success of the Japanese firms' penetration of the U.S. automo-
bile market in the 1970s, General Motors continues to account for the
largest share of automobile sales in the United States.
Coupon Competition, 14 BELLJ. ECON. 315 (1983) (entrant induces incumbent accommoda-
tion by committing to limited entry).
76 Cf. Richard Gilbert, Pre-Emptive Competition, in NEw DEVELOPMENTS IN THE ANALYSIS
OF MARKET STRUCTURE 120 (Mathewson & Stiglitz eds., 1986) (if entrants would be small,
incumbent firms are better off allowing entry, even if deterrence is feasible).
" Katz & Shapiro, supra note 67; cf. Ralph Landau & Nathan Rosenberg, Innovation
in the Chemical Processing Industries, in NAT'L ACADEMY OF ENGINEERING, TECHNOLOGY &
ECONOMICS 107, 111-14 (1991).
78 The Big Three had used an imitation strategy successfully in the previous decade
against a U.S. fringe, including American Motors, that had been successful for a time
producing and selling compact cars. When subcompacts were introduced in the 1970s,
the Big Three sought to repeat that success. Henry Ford 1I reportedly declared that the
Big Three's new small cars would "drive the Japanese back to the sea." John E. Kwoka,
International Joint Venture: General Motors and Toyota, in THE ANTITRUST REVOLUTION 48
(John Kwoka & Lawrence White eds., 1989) (quoting a paraphrase reported by the Wall
Street Journal).
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Risk aversion is a third factor that may encourage leading firm accom-
modation rather than deterrence. " R&D is risky. The likely R&D ap-
proaches may fail technically, new processes may not work, and new
products may be marketplace failures. The status quo plausibly mini-
mizes risk for the leading firms: they typically have a successful produc-
tion and distribution technology. If risks of innovation failure are high,
and the leading firms are risk averse, they have an incentive not to
innovate first, even if a new technology, approach, or product has a
greater expected return than the existing products or processes. Instead,
they may benefit from waiting until successful new ideas are proven
elsewhere before seeking to imitate them.
This factor may have played a role in the Big Three's incentive not
to introduce compact car models aggressively in the 1970s. The invest-
ment in developing small cars was risky because of uncertainties about
the stability of the OPEC oil cartel, the most important source of the
demand shift favoring small cars. Although it actually took a dozen years
for oil prices to return (in real terms) to their pre-OPEC levels, the Big
Three might reasonably have considered it possible that the oil shocks
would last only a couple years.s
Finally, the leading firms are more likely to prefer accommodation to
deterrence when their oligopoly interaction is coordinated.8 ' Coordinat-
ing oligopolists must take care to avoid reaching an agreement and so
violating the antitrust laws. 2 In terms of price and output decisions, this
constraint likely restricts the feasible set of coordinated arrangements
to those consistent with a simple focal rule-such as outcomes reached
79 See Gilbert & Newbery, supra note 71, at 571 (risk aversion reduces incentives for
preemptive innovation).
0 This factor may also explain the decision by integrated U.S. steelmakers to delay
adopting then-innovative basic oxygen furnace technology after World War II. See Sharon
Oster, The Diffusion of Innovation Among Steel Firms: The Basic Oxygen Furnace, 13 BELL J.
EcoN. 45 (1982). European and Japanese steelmakers rebuilding from the ground up
tended to chose the new technology rather than the older open hearth technology employed
by the U.S. mills. But a U.S. producer could reasonably decide to wait before switching,
until the cost savings and quality potential of the new technology had been proven. Thus,
the U.S. steelmakers did not switch until a decade after European and Japanese firms had
demonstrated the success of the new technology. A similar microeconomic story may
explain the international "convergence" of productivity levels in a number of industries.
See BAUMOL ET AL., supra note 4.
" Oligopoly behavior is coordinated when, in repeated interactions, firm strategies de-
pend on history. See generally Baker, supra note 68, at 156 n.22, 195-96.
12 Behavior may be coordinated without the firms violating the antitrust laws through
tacit or express collusion. The antitrust laws do not prohibit supracompetitive prices or
coordinated behavior per se; they prohibit coordination reached through process of negoti-
ation and the exchange of mutual assurances of carrying through the negotiated consensus.
See generally id. at 179.
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by altering all prices by a common percentage or by avoiding solicitation
of customers historically served by rivals.83
If a coordinated innovation strategy is constrained to follow self-evi-
dent rules, coordinated accommodation of fringe innovation may be
more likely than coordinated deterrence. A coordinated strategy of lead-
ing firm accommodation can often plausibly be established without nego-
tiation, and compliance with it readily assured. In contrast, focal rules
for a coordinated strategy of deterring fringe innovation through pre-
emptive leading firm R&D may be more difficult for the firms to identify,
because the results of research and development activity are uncertain.
The greater difficulty of coordinating deterrence may have encouraged
the Big Three automobile oligopolists to adopt a fringe innovation accom-
modation strategy during the 1970s.
III. ON MARKET STRUCTURE AND INDUSTRY INNOVATION
This article has identified a number of factors that affect the relative
incentives of fringe firms and leading firms to innovate. Other aspects
of market structure also influence investments in R&D and the prospects
for innovation. Most important, the economic literature on the influence
of market structure on innovation has emphasized a complementary
issue: whether seller concentration encourages or discourages industry
innovation. Yet, as with the differing innovation incentives of fringe and
leading firms, the theoretical and empirical studies of the influence of
seller concentration on innovation have not led to the identification of
a general rule applicable to most industries.
Two competing sets of theories, each associated with a famous econo-
mist, address whether a product market monopolist will innovate more
or less than firms in a competitive industry.84 Kenneth Arrow demon-
strated that a monopolist may have less incentive to innovate than compet-
itors because a monopolist may have more to lose. A monopolist could
spend a great deal of money to lower cost, improve quality, or add a
product line only to find that it does not get much additional business
as a result-because, unlike a competitor, it already has most of the
business there is to get.85 Joseph Schumpeter had previously highlighted
I ld. at 162-69.
84 For arguments on both sides of the Arrow vs. Schumpeter "debate," see Richard
Gilbert & Steven Sunshine, Incorporating Dynamic Efficiency Concerns in Merger Analysis: The
Use of Innovation Markets, supra this issue, 63 ANTITRUST L.J. 569 (1995); WILLIAM L.
BALDWIN & JOHN T. SCOTT, MARKET STRUCTURE AND TECHNOLOGICAL CHANGE (1987).
15 See Kenneth J. Arrow, Economic Welfare and the Allocation of Resources for Innovation, in
ESSAYS IN THE THEORY OF RISK-BEARING 144 (3d ed. 1976). Monopoly may also discourage
innovation because a monopolist's employees may resist innovations that would threaten
the existing organizational structure.
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reasons why monopoly instead may encourage innovation, such as
greater access to low cost internal finance, greater ability to take advan-
tage of scale economies in R&D, and greater ability to appropriate the
full value of its new ideas.8 6
Empirical researchers have sought to determine which of these theo-
ries are in practice the more important.87 But methodological problems
make the empirical results difficult to interpret,8 8 and recent articles
appear to identify biases that led many earlier studies incorrectly appear
to suggest that seller concentration typically promotes innovation."
The sobering conclusion from both economic literatures-the analysis
of the relative incentives of fringe and leading firms to innovate set forth
above and the complementary literature on the relationship between
seller concentration and industry innovative effort-is that the primary
determinants of innovation can readily vary from one industry to the
86 See JOSEPH SCHUMPETER, CAPITALISM, SOCIALISM, AND DEMOCRACY 81-106 (1942);
1 MORTON 1. KAMIEN, MARKET STRUCTURE AND INNOVATION REVISITED, JAPAN AND THE
WORLD ECONOMY 331 (1989).
87 See generally Cohen & Levin, supra note 67, at 1074-79; JOHN SCOTT, PURPOSIVE
DIVERSIFICATION AND ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE 84-90 (1993); Baldwin & Scott, supra note
84, at 63-113.
A typical study compares research and development intensity with seller concentration
across a large number of industries. The many methodological problems raised by this
approach include the following four. First, R&D intensity, an input into innovation, may
not be a good proxy for innovation rates. Second, seller concentration (even in conjunction
with some measure of entry barriers) may not be a good proxy for the extent of market
power within an industry. Concentration does not necessarily beget market power, and
concentration is typically measured for industry definitions at great variance from the
conceptually appropriate markets. Third, the posited link between industry structure and
innovation ignores the reverse possibility, that the extent of technological change affects
the degree of concentration, and the possibility that both market structure and innovative
activity derive from more basic sources. Cf. Joseph Stiglitz & Partha Dasgupta, Industrial
Structure and the Nature of Innovative Activity, 90 ECON. J. 266, 267 (1980) (market concentra-
tion should not be treated as an exogenous determinant of innovative activity). Fourth,
the results will be biased if cross-industry differences in the opportunity for innovation,
or differences in the degree to which firms can appropriate the gains from innovation,
are related to market structure.
" One recent study identifies a large "pro-Schumpeterian bias" in the prior literature
resulting from the failure to control for the first and fourth problems indicated in the
previous note. P.A. Geroski, Innovation, Technological Opportunity, and Market Structure, 42
OXFORD ECON. PAPERS 586 (1990). Other recent studies demonstrate that when variation
in the degree of appropriability across industries is controlled for, the previously apparent
relationship between innovation and product market concentration largely disappears.
Richard C. Levin et al., R&D Appropriability, Opportunity, and Market Structure: New Evidence
on Some Schumpeterian Hypotheses, 75 AM. ECON. REV. 20 (Papers and Proceedings, May
1985); cf. SCOTT, supra note 87, at 87 (the relationship between seller concentration and
R&D intensity also disappears once company and industry specific effects-which poten-
tially reflect appropriability conditions-are controlled for); but cf. Zvi Griliches, Comments
on Levin, Klevorick, Nelson & Winter, 1987 BROOKINGS PAPERS ON ECON. ACTIVITY 824
(questioning the strength of the appropriability measure also used by Levin et al., supra.).
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next.9 ° Accordingly, any effort to understand the influence of changes
in market structure on innovation-the problem confronting antitrust
enforcers and courts-should pay attention to the specific factors affect-
ing firm R&D investments in individual industries through a case-by-
case analysis.
90 Similarly, empirical economists have learned the critical role of industry-specific factors
in identifying the exercise of market power. See Timothy Bresnahan, Empirical Studies of
Industries with Market Power, in 2 HANDBOOK OF INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION 1011-57 (Rich-
ard Schmalensee & Robert D. Willig eds., 1989).
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